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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the Fifth Circuit addressed a limited number of federal
environmental cases during the survey period, the court's opinions addressed
extremely significant issues regarding the right of contribution under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) and the scope of Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause.' The court also issued a significant opinion relating to requirements
applicable to nonattainment areas under the Clean Air Act.2 Finally, the court
limited the availability of citizen suits under the Clean Water Act by finding
that Louisiana administrative enforcement procedures were "comparable" to
federal requirements.'
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University, School of Law. M.P.H., Harvard University,
1989; J.D., Columbia University, 1976; B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1972. Of Counsel,
Gardere, Wynne & Sewell, Dallas, Texas. E-Mail: jgaba@smu.edu.
I. See discussion infra Parts II, Ill.
2. See discussion infra Part IV.
3. See discussion infra Part VI.
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
II. AVAILABILITY OF CONTRIBUTION UNDER CERCLA FOLLOWING A
"VOLUNTARY" CLEANUP: A VIALL SERVICES, INC. V, COOPER INDUSTRIES,
INC.
During the last survey period, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit held in
Aviall Services, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc. that private parties do not have
a right of contribution under the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Recovery Act unless they have been subject to a
government enforcement order orjudicial proceeding In effect, the panel's
decision would have eliminated a right of cost recovery under CERCLA for
most private parties who voluntarily clean up property.' The author of last
year's survey quite properly described Aviall as one of the most significant
CERCLA cases issued in recent years.6
In November 2002, however, the full Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc,
reversed the panel.7 The full court, in what surprisingly was an issue of first
impression among federal courts of appeal, held that a right of contribution
exists under CERCLA even if a plaintiff has not been subject to a prior
government action.' The 10-3 opinion was authored by Judge Jones.9
The relevant facts in Aviall are straightforward.'0 Aviall Services
purchased property from Cooper Industries that was contaminated with
various hazardous substances." After prodding from the then Texas Natural
Resources Conservation Commission, Aviall began cleaning up the property.'2
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) never took any action regarding
cleanup of the property. ' 3 After expending millions of dollars on the cleanup,
Aviall brought an action seeking contribution under CERCLA 4 and cost
4. 263 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2001), rev 'd, 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. Nov. 2002).
5. Id.
6. Jennifer Hodgkins, Environmental Law, 33 TEx. TECH L. REv. 845 (2002).
7. Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. Nov. 2002), petition for cert.
filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3552 (U.S. Feb. 12, 2003) (No. 02-1192). The author ofthis survey piece represented
Aviall Services and was involved in drafting appellate briefs in this case.
8. Id. Perhaps even more surprising, the amicus brief filed by the Department of Justice at the
request of the Fifth Circuit argued that CERCLA did not authorize a right of contribution in the absence
of a pending or prior civil action under CERCLA. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4-6,
Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. Nov. 2002), petition for cert. filed, 71
U.S.L.W. 3552 (U.S. Feb. 12, 2003) (No. 02-1192). Completing the surprise, the majority ignored the
government's position and relegated it to a passing mention in a footnote by the dissent. See AviallServi.,
Inc., 312 F.3d at 692 n.2 (Garza, J., dissenting). The Solicitor General's decision to argue for a narrow
cause of action under CERCLA is, in the mind of this writer, the major, underreported environmental law
position of the Bush Administration.





14. CERCLA has two separate cost recovery provisions. See Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act [hereinafter CERCLA of 1980,42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(aX4)(B),
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recovery under various state law theories.' The district court dismissed
Aviall's CERCLA claim holding that there was no right of contribution under
section 113(f) unless the plaintiff has been subject to a prior CERCLA
action.' 6 A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed." The full panel,
sitting en banc, reversed.'
The case involved the interpretation of the express right of contribution
contained in section 113(f)(1) of CERCLA.' 9 This section provides,
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 9607(a) [section 107(a)] of this title, during
or following any civil action under section 9606 [section 106] of this title or
under section 9607(a) of this title .... Nothing in this subsection shall
diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the
absence of a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of
this title.20
Acknowledging that reasonable minds could differ over the interpretation of
section 113(f)(1), the majority of the en banc panel nonetheless held that the
language of the section, its legislative history, the prior interpretations of the
Fifth Circuit and other courts of appeal, and policy considerations all
supported a construction that allowed a right of contribution in the absence of
a prior civil action.2'
9613(f) (2000). When originally adopted in 1980, CERCLA had a private cost recovery cause of action
in section 107(a)(4)(B). See CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 107(a)(4)(B), 94 Stat. 2767,2781 (1980).
In 1986, Congress added an express right of contribution in section 113(f). See CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 99-
499, § I 13(f), 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). The relationship between these two sections is unclear; the Supreme
Court has described the two sections as "similar and somewhat overlapping." Key Tronic Corp. v. United
States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994). Aviall originally pleaded causes of action under sections 107(a)(4)(B)
and 113(f) of CERCLA. Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., No. CIV.A.397CVI926D, 2000 WL
31730, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2000), rev'd, 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. Nov. 2002). Aviall subsequently
amended its pleadings to allege a combined section 107/113 claim. Id. The district court characterized
Aviall's action as dropping any independent claim under section 107(a)(4)(B), but Aviall, in its briefs,
disputed this characterization claiming that its case involved a combined claim brought under both 107 and
113. Id. at *4. Such a combined claim is suggested by the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Geraghty & Miller,
Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 234 F.3d 917 (5th Cir. 2000). The full panel in Aviall noted the parties' dispute over
whether the suit was brought under section 107(a)(4)(B) as well as section 113(f)(1) but stated that it was
"unnecessary to reach this question or to opine more concretely on the theoretical problems surrounding
this 'overlap' of remedies." 312 F.3d at 685 n. 15. Depending on the final resolution of the issues inAviall,
the question may arise regarding whether a PRP who does not have a right of contribution under section
113(l)(1) nonetheless has an independent claim under section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA.





20. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000).
21. Aviall Servs., Inc., 312 F.3d at 677.
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The majority first evaluated the history of section 113(0.22 Prior to the
adoption of section 1 13(f), courts, including the Fifth Circuit, had allowed
potentially responsible parties (PRPs) to sue for cost recovery under section
107(a)(4)(B) in the absence of prior government involvement, and many
federal courts had found an implied right of contribution to allow cost
allocation among PRPs.23 The legislative history of section 1 13(1) suggested
that Congress intended to "clarify" and "confirm" this implied right of
contribution.24 The majority in Aviall found that the limited legislative history
supported a few "general observations" regarding section 1 13(0.25 First, the
section's avowed purpose was to give PRPs the explicit right to sue for
contribution and confirm earlier decisions of federal courts. 26 Second,
Congress intended that courts develop equitable solutions for apportioning
cleanup costs.27 Third, although "snippets" of legislative history indicate that
Congress clearly intended that a right of contribution exist after a PRP has
been sued under sections 107 or 106, the legislative history was contradictory
and, in many cases, referred to different versions of section 113(f) that were
not ultimately adopted.2' According to the full panel, these bits of legislative
history "yield no guide" to interpretation. 29 The court did note, however, that
"it would seem odd that a legislature concerned with clarifying the right to
contribution among PRPs and with facilitating the courts' development of
federal common law apportionment principles would have rather arbitrarily
cut back the then-prevailing standard of contribution."3
Next, the court evaluated the express language of section 1 13(0.3" The
problem with construction of this section is its odd syntax.32 The first
sentence establishes a right of contribution "during or following" certain "civil
actions," and the last sentence provides that the first sentence does not
"diminish" the right of contribution in the absence of such civil actions.33 The
dissent would read the first sentence as exclusive and construe the last
sentence as preserving rights of contribution under state law.34 The majority
rejected the linguistic twists necessary to support the dissent's conclusion and
held that the two sentences were, in fact, complementary. 5 The first sentence
22. Id. at 683.,
23. Id.




28. Id. at 685.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 686.
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 692 (Garza, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 686. In the dissent's construction, the word "may" in the first sentence must mean
[Vol. 35:831
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establishes a "particular" right of contribution, but the last sentence provides
that nothing shall "diminish" any other contribution right available to the
parties.36 According to the majority, "[tihe first and last sentences of
§ 1 3(f)(1) combine to afford the maximum latitude to parties involved in the
complex and costly business of hazardous waste site cleanups. 37
The majority also found its construction consistent with the prior
holdings of the Fifth Circuit and other courts. 3' Although no court of appeals
had expressly ruled on the issue, the court found that "numerous published
cases decided after" adoption of section 113(f) had allowed claims for
contribution where no action had previously been brought under sections 106
or 107 of CERCLA.39 The majority claimed that the dissent's construction
"has thrown into uncertainty more than two decades of CERCLA practice, if
the pre-CERCLA common law of contribution is included."40 Although not
"inconceivable," such a result, according to the panel, places a heavy burden
onjustifying a construction of section 113(f) under a "plain meaning" reading
of the statute.4'
Finally, the court evaluated the policy implications of its interpretation.42
According to the majority, the dissent's reading would
create substantial obstacles to achieving the purposes of CERCLA-not only
by slowing the reallocation of cleanup costs from less culpable PRPs to more
culpable PRPs and by discouraging the voluntary expenditure of PRP funds
on cleanup activities, but by diminishing the incentives for PRPs voluntarily
to report contamination to state agencies.43
"shall," and the word "only" must impliedly be added. Id. at 692 (Garza, J., dissenting). The majority, in
contrast, thought "may" simply meant "may." Id. at 686. Another critical problem arises from the dissent's
interpretation. Since the first sentence only allows a right of contribution during or following a "civil
action," the dissent.is forced to limit the right of contribution following receipt of a unilateral administrative
order issued under section 106. Id. at 692 (Garza, J., dissenting). The dissent expressly states that the
reference to civil action in section 113(0(1) refers only to "an action brought in federal court," and
therefore, according to the dissent, if a party receives a unilateral administrative order, a right of
contribution exists only if the government files suit in federal court to enforce the order. Id. at 692 n.4
(Garza, J., dissenting). In other words, the dissent would eliminate a right of contribution by parties who
expend money in response to a unilateral administrative order. See id. (Garza, J., dissenting). This, of
course, would create a perverse incentive to violate a unilateral order since a right of contribution would
exist only if the government were forced to sue for enforcement. See id. (Garza, J., dissenting). The
majority found this construction unnecessary in light of its conclusion that CERCLA provides a right of
contribution among PRPs at any time, including following an administrative order. Id. at 686-87.
36. Id. at 687.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 688-89.
39. Id. at 688.
40. Id. at 689.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 688-91.
43. Id. at 689-90. The majority implies that parties would be discouraged from voluntarily
reporting contamination to state authorities since, under the dissent's construction, parties would have no
right of contribution under CERCLA even if a PRP were to clean up property in response to an
2004]
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The court concluded that its interpretation better fulfilled CERCLA's
purposes."
The three person dissent, in contrast, found that "the plain language and
statutory structure ofCERCLA's contribution provisions demonstrate that the
contribution remedy in § 1 13(0(1) requires a prior or pending § 106 or § 107
action."4 In their interpretation, the first sentence of section 113(0(1)
establishes an exclusive right to contribution that exists only after a prior or
pending civil action under sections 106 or 107.46 The last sentence of section
113(f)(1), according to the dissent, is a "savings provision" that preserves
rights of contribution under state law.47 Thus, in the absence of a prior federal
court action or an approved settlement with the government, PRPs have no
right of contribution under CERCLA.48
The Supreme Court has, however, granted a petition for certiorari, and
the jury, so to speak, is still out on the issue in Aviall.49
unambiguous order from a state agency. See id.
44. Id. at691.
45. Id. at 695 (Garza, J., dissenting). It is impossible not to note that in this conclusion the dissent
misstates the first sentence of section 113(f)(1), which authorizes a right of contribution following a prior
or pending "civil action" under sections 106 or 107. The dissent is not unaware of this issue, and as
discussed above, the dissent would limit the right of contribution in section 113(0(1) to parties who have
been subject to a civil action in federal court. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. The dissentwould
not allow contribution by parties who have responded to an administrative order issued under section 106.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
46. Avial Servs., Inc., 312 F.3d at 692 (Garza, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 687. The dissent also says the statute oflimitations applicable to claims for contribution
supports its conclusion. Id. at 694 (Garza, J., dissenting). Under section 113(g), a claim for contribution
must be brought within three years from judgment in an action under sections 106 or 107. Id. (Garza, J.,
dissenting). In contrast, a claim for cost recovery under section 107(a)(4)(B) is triggered by the dates of
completion or initiation of cleanup activity. Id. (Garza, J., dissenting). Since most courts have held that
an action for cost recovery by a PRP is a claim for contribution, courts have struggled to interpret the
applicable statute of limitations for a PRP cost recovery claim in the absence of a prior judgment. In
Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 234 F.3d 917 (5th Cir. 2000), the Fifth Circuit, when faced with
this issue, had previously stated that a PRP claim for contribution brought in the absence of a prior
judgment was subject to the statute of limitations applicable to section 107(a)(4)(B) claims. The dissent
in Aviall characterized this analysis as "unnecessary." Aviall Servs., Inc., 312 F.3d at 696 (Garza, J.,
dissenting).
48. AviallServs., Inc., 312 F.3d at 693-94 (Garza, J., dissenting). In addition to section 113(0(1),
section 1I 3(0(3)(B) provides a right of coritribution by parties who have entered into an administrative or
judicially approved settlement with the government. Id. at 695 n. 1 (Garza, J., dissenting). The dissent
uses this provision to reach a remarkable conclusion in a footnote. Id. (Garza, J., dissenting). Under
section 113(l)(2) of CERCLA, persons who settle with the government are entitled to protection from
contribution from non-settling parties. Id. (Garza, J., dissenting). This has, since its adoption in 1986, been
seen as a major incentive to settle. See id. (Garza, J., dissenting). In the dissent's view, section
113(0(3)(B) also creates an additional and apparently unrecognized incentive to settle. Id. (Garza, J.,
dissenting). Under the dissent's interpretation, settling parties are not only provided contribution protection
but nonsettling parties have no right of contribution against any party-settling or not. Allowing a
nonsettling party to bring an action for contribution would, according to the dissent, "undermine these
incentives" to settle. Id. (Garza, J., dissenting).
49. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (mem.).
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III. LIMITS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
In United States v. Lopez"° and United States v. Morrison,5' the Supreme
Court revolutionized federal jurisprudence on the limits of federal authority
under the Commerce Clause. 2 In these cases, the Supreme Court invalidated
federal statutes based on the Court's conclusion that they exceeded Congress's
authority. 3 In light of the Supreme Court's new jurisprudence, federal
environmental requirements are increasingly being challenged as exceeding
constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause. 4 In the last year, the
Fifth Circuit considered and rejected Commerce Clause challenges to two
federal requirements: asbestos removal requirements under the Clean Air Act
and limitations on land development arising under the Endangered Species
Act."
A. United States v. Ho: The Commerce Clause and the Clean Air Act
Asbestos NESHAP
United States v. Ho involved an appeal of a conviction for violating
federal notification and workplace standards contained in the National
Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) for asbestos.
5 6
The defendant, Mr. Ho, was convicted in the district court after doing almost
everything possible to violate the asbestos NESHAP. 7 Mr. Ho purchased a
commercial building with knowledge that it contained asbestos. 8 He rejected
bids for asbestos abatement by professional contractors because they were too
high.59 He undertook the removal without notifying the government and
employed untrained workers to remove the asbestos.60 After being "red
50. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In Lopez, the Court found that the federal statute limiting the possession
of firearms within a certain distance from schools was beyond Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause. Id. at 63 1. Thus, was the federal "Gun-Free School Zones Act" transformed into the "Leave No
Gun Behind Act"?
51. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). in Morrison, the Court invalidated the "Violence Against Women Act"
that created a federal civil remedy for victims ofgender-related violence. Id.
52. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598.
53. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598.
54. See infra Part III.A.
55. See infra Part III.A.
56. 311 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. Oct. 2002). These standards were adopted under section 112 of the
Clean Air Act, which authorizes the EPA to adopt "National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants" or NESHAPs. Id. at 594. Under section 114(a), the EPA has also adopted reporting
requirements. Id. at 595. The workplace standards and reporting requirements are codified in the asbestos
NESHAP. 40 C.F.R. § 61.142.
57. 311F.3dat593.
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tagged" and stopped by local inspectors, he resumed the removal at night.6'
At his orders, a worker attempted to wash down the work area by attaching
hoses to what turned out to be a pressurized gas line and, in the process, blew
a hole in the building.
62
Mr. Ho was convicted of criminal violations of the federal NESHAP
requirements. 63 The district court, which had dismissed several counts sought
by the government, rejected certain sentence enhancement recommendations
of the probation officer.64 Mr. Ho appealed his conviction on several grounds,
including a challenge to federal commerce clause authority, procedures for
adoption of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS),65 and
certainjury instructions." The government appealed the trial court's rejection
of sentence enhancement.67
61. Id. at 592.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 593.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 594. The court rejected the procedural challenge to the 1990 promulgation of
amendments to the asbestos NESHAP. Id. Under section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, a challenge to
the rulemaking can be brought only in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and must
be brought within sixty days of promulgation. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000). The court stated that the
Supreme Court's opinion in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978) did not authorize
an otherwise untimely challenge to procedural defects in a regulation. Ho, 311 F.3d at 607.
66. Ho, 311 F.3d at 604. The court rejected the defendant's challenge to the trial court's refusal
to include an interstate commerce clause jurisdictional element in the jury instructions. Id. The court held
that Lopez did not create a newjurisdictional element in all federal prosecutions. Id. Further, the court held
that no jury instruction was required since there was no explicit statutoryjurisdictional element, and unlike
Lopez and the prior Fifth Circuit opinion in United States v. Threadgill, 172 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 1999),
"neither the asbestos work place standard nor the facts of this case cast doubt on Congress' ability to
regulate Ho's conduct." Ho, 311 F.3d at 605, 607.
The court also rejected a challenge to the trial court's failure to include instructions stating that
defendant must have knowledge, not only of the facts of the asbestos removal, but also of the regulatory
requirements. Id. at 605. The court stated that it "need refer only to the venerable maxim that 'Ignorance
of the law is no defense,' "but then gave a more elaborate analysis of why knowledge of the regulations
is not required for criminal prosecution. Id.
67. The government appealed the trial court's refusal to apply a six-level sentence enhancement
for an "ongoing, continuous or repetitive discharge, release or emission of a hazardous or toxic substance
or pesticide into the environment" under federal sentencing guidelines. Id. at 608 (quoting U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q1.2(b)(l)(A) (2003)). The trial court had found that the evidence
did not support a finding that asbestos had been released outside the building and thus had not entered "into
the environment." Id. The Fifth Circuit reversed based on its holding that the trial court "clearly erred"
in its factual findings. Id. The court held that "[t]he government has proven an asbestos discharge by a
preponderance of the evidence, which is all that is required at the sentencing phase." Id. at 610.
The government also appealed the trial court's refusal to apply a two-level sentence enhancement for
the defendant's status as "an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more
participants or was otherwise extensive." Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1. l(a)
(2003)). The issue for the court involved interpretation of the phrase "otherwise extensive." Id. The
district court had apparently interpreted this phrase to refer to the "nature of the criminal organization" as
distinguished from the number of persons involved. Id. Reviewing the trial court's legal interpretation de
novo, the court applied "application note 3" to the sentencing guidelines and held that a finding of
"otherwise extensive" is to be based on the number of persons involved and not the nature of the criminal
organization. Id. The court vacated and remanded for new sentencing "in light of the proper and
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The defendant claimed that he was convicted under laws that exceeded
Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. 8 The Fifth Circuit stressed
that this was not a facial challenge to the Clean Air Act but only an "as-
applied challenge" to the asbestos NESHAP.69 The court began with a "first
principles" discussion of the rationale of the commerce clause and continued
with a review of the Supreme Court's recent Commerce Clause analysis in
Lopez and Morrison."°
The outline of the Commerce Clause analysis from Lopez and Morrison
is now familiar.7' Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to
regulate "three broad categories" of activity: (1) the use of the channels of
interstate commerce, (2) activities that affect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, and (3) those activities having a "substantial relation" to interstate
commerce." This last category, the broadest of the three, requires that the
activity "substantially affect" interstate commerce. 73 This "substantial effect"
test can reach activity that itself substantially affects interstate commerce or
"intrastate commercial activity that by itself is too trivial to have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce but which, when aggregated with similar and
related activity, can substantially affect interstate commerce. '74 Four
significant considerations guide an aggregation analysis: (1) the economic or
commercial nature of the regulated intrastate activity, (2) a jurisdictional
element in the challenged statute that might limit the statute's reach to a
discrete set of activities, (3) congressional findings, and (4) the degree of
attenuation between the regulated intrastate activity and the substantial effect
on interstate commerce. 5
In Ho, the court noted the government's (perhaps surprising) concession
that the regulations could only bejustified through a substantial effect analysis
applying the "aggregation principle."' 6 Thus, the court states that "this case
presents the limited question whether the aggregation principle extends to
violations of the asbestos work practice standard. 77
The court found that implementation of the asbestos NESHAP was
within Congress's Commerce Clause authority.7 The primaryj ustification for
the court's holding was that asbestos removal services are commercial
longstanding interpretation of that phrase." Id. at 611.
68. Id. at 594 (referring to U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, ci. 3).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 597-98.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 598.
74. Id. at 599.
75. Id. at 599-601 (citations omitted).
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activities in today's economy.79 The court noted that state and federal
governments license asbestos removal businesses and that most removal is for
commercial purpose." The court stated that the defendant's activities were
driven by commercial considerations because asbestos removal was required
if he wanted to use the building for commercial purposes." The court
concluded that "[w]e can say with confidence, then, that asbestos removal in
this case, unlike gun possession in a school zone or sex-based violence, is a
commercial activity.
82
The court stated that the relationship between asbestos removal and
interstate commerce is "not attenuated, but direct and apparent." 3 By
violating the standards, the defendant gained a competitive advantage over
other licensed companies." The court also found that the defendant's
activities, if aggregated with others, would pose a threat to the interstate
commercial real estate market by reducing the number of companies providing
asbestos removal services.85
The court concluded by observing two important limiting principles of
its holding.86 "First, it applie[d] only to commercial activities. Second, the
presence of a national market in the regulated activity" served to limit the
scope of the court's analysis.8
The court's analysis is somewhat puzzling. The court comes close to
saying that any intrastate commercial activity, at least a commercial activity
in which there is a national market, is subject to regulation by Congress under
the Commerce Clause. The court, however, ignores the consequences that
follow if the regulation itself creates the commercial market. In other words,
the court never addressed the significance of the fact that the federal NESHAP
requirements themselves may have contributed to creating the national market
in asbestos removal services that serves tojustify federal regulatory authority.
The court's constitutional analysis, thus, has something of a bootstrap quality
to it.
B. GDF RealtyInvestments v. Norton: The Commerce Clause
and the Endangered Species Act
Five months after issuing its opinion in Ho, the Fifth Circuit in GDF





83. Id. at 603.
84. Id.





to application of the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA)."8 The relevant
facts in GDF Realty were undisputed. 9 After some considerable procedural
wrangling, the plaintiffs were advised that their planned development
activities would constitute a "take" of endangered species that is prohibited
under section 9 of the Endangered Species Act." The defendant Fish and
Wildlife Service also denied an "incidental take" permit that would have
authorized some development.9 The endangered species at issue were six
species of subterranean invertebrates (the "Cave Species") that were located
solely within Texas. 92 Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that the ESA take
provision, as applied to the Cave Species, was an unconstitutional application
of federal authority under the Commerce Clause. 93
The court relied on its analysis in Ho for a basic discussion of the
parameters of a Commerce Clause challenge.' This case, however, raised
critical issues that were not addressed in Ho. 95 The first issue involved
identification of the "regulated activity" for purposes of a Commerce Clause
analysis: Was it limited to the defendant's actions that resulted in the Cave
Species takes or was it the defendant's overall proposed commercial
development?" The Fifth Circuit concluded that "the scope of inquiry is
primarily whether the expressly regulated activity substantially affects
interstate commerce, i.e., whether takes, be they of the Cave Species or of all
endangered species in the aggregate, have the substantial effect."
97
To do otherwise, the court stated, would result in "no limit to Congress'
authority to regulate intrastate activities, so long as those subjected to the
regulation were entities which had an otherwise substantial connection to
interstate commerce."9' The court stated that this conclusion was consistent
with its opinion in Ho and with at least some of the logic in opinions in the
D.C. and Ninth Circuits that had previously upheld application of the ESA in
88. 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. Mar. 2003).
89. Id. at 627.
90. Id. at 626; 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(l)(B) (2000). Under section 1538(a)(l)(B), it is unlawful to
"take" an endangered species. § 1538(a)(1)(B). Under the statute, "take" means to "harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect." Id. § 1532(19). The Fish and Wildlife Service has, by
regulation, defined "harm" to include "significant habitat modification or degradation" that actually kills
or injures wildlife. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. The Supreme Court had previously upheld the validity of this
regulation. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
91. Norton, 326 F.3d at 626.
92. Id. at 625.
93. Id. In a separate action, the plaintiffs also claimed that the government's action constituted a
Fifth Amendment taking of private property for public use withoutjust compensation. Id. at 626-27. That
action was stayed pending the resolution of this case. Id. at 627.
94. Id. at 627-28.
95. Id. at 633.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 634.
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the face of Commerce Clause challenges." Thus, the court focused solely on
the developers' impact on endangered species rather than their broader
commercial development activity in evaluating the legitimacy of federal
regulation under the Commerce Clause.' 0
In its resulting Commerce Clause analysis, the court first rejected an
argument that scientific and commercial interest in the Cave Species
themselves justified regulation.' Acknowledging that some connection
existed between the study of the Cave Species and interstate commerce, the
court held that this connection was negligible and did not satisfy the
substantial effects test.'02 The court also held that any possibility of future
economic benefits arising from these particular endangered species was "too
hypothetical and attenuated" to justify regulation under the Commerce
Clause.)°3
The court nonetheless found that regulation under the ESA was justified
under the Commerce Clause.' ° Thejustification was based on the substantial
effect, not on the loss of the particular Cave Species, but of all endangered
species.'0 5 In other words, the Commerce Clause justified federal regulation
to protect all endangered species even if the protection of any single species
might not be an adequate justification." This holding was based on the
court's view of the ESA as a comprehensive regulatory program designed to
protect against the economic impacts associated with an overall loss of
endangered species.' °7 The court further found that this link was not
attenuated.'0 8 The court concluded that the "ESA is an economic regulatory
scheme; the regulation of intrastate takes of the Cave Species is an essential
part of it. Therefore, Cave Species takes may be aggregated with all other
ESA takes."'0 9 Thus, Congress apparently has authority under the Commerce
Clause to protect a single endangered species based on the consequence of
losing many endangered species.°"0
99. id. at 635-36; see Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. deniedsub. nom., Gibbs
v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998) (a pre-Morrison decision).
100. Norton, 326 F.3d at 636-40.
101. Id. at 637-38.
102. Id. at 637.
103. Id. at 638.
104. Id. at 640-41.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 638-4 1.
107. Id. at 640.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 640-4 1.
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IV. FEDERAL APPROVAL OF STATE IMPLEMENTATION PLANS UNDER THE
CLEAN AIR ACT: SIERRA CLUB V. EPA
Sierra Club v. EPA involved a challenge brought by several
environmental organizations to the EPA's approval of the Texas State
Implementation Plan (SIP) for the Beaumont-Port Arthur area.' In this case,
the court addressed two significant issues associated with the EPA's approval
of SIPs under the Clean Air Act: the validity of an EPA extension of an
applicable statutory compliance date and the criteria for assessment of
"reasonably available control measures" (RACMs) in a nonattainment SIP." 2
A. Extension of the Nonattainment Compliance Date
Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, areas that had not met the
NAAQS for ozone were divided into a variety of subcategories ranging from
marginal to extreme." 3 The Amendments established statutory compliance
dates for each subcategory." 4 Among other potential consequences, an area
that fails to meet its attainment deadline may be "bumped up" to the next more
stringent classification."'
In March 1999, the EPA issued a "notice of interpretation" of the Clean
Air Act that established a policy of extending the otherwise applicable
statutory compliance date for "moderate" and "serious" ozone nonattainment
areas." 6 The policy generally applied if these areas' failure to attain
compliance resulted from emissions from "upwind" nonattainment areas that
have a later compliance date."' Rather than accelerate the upwind region's
compliance date, the policy generally allowed an extension of the downwind
region's compliance date to the later compliance date of the upwind region."
8
The Beaumont-Port Arthur area at issue in this case was categorized as
a moderate ozone nonattainment area and thus had a statutory compliance date
of November 15, 1996." ' The area, however, was affected by emissions from
Iil. 314 F.3d 735 (5th Cir. Dec. 2002).
112. Id. at 737.
113. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 7511 a(a)-(e) (2000).
114. Sierra Club, 314 F.3d at 737-38; see 42 U.S.C. § 751 I(a)(l).
115. Sierra Club, 314 F.3d at 738; see § 7511(b)(2).
116. Sierra Club, 314 F.3d at 738; see Extension of Attainment Dates for Downwind Transport
Areas, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,441 (Mar. 25, 1999).
117. Sierra Club, 314 F.3d at 738. The policy required that the downwind "moderate" or "serious"
area (1) be "identified as a downwind area 'affected by transport from either an upwind area in the same
State with a later attainment date or an upwind area in another State that significantly contributes to
downwind nonattainment' "and (2) submit a SIP that generally demonstrates compliance by the required
attainment date for the upwind area. Id. This includes adoption and implementation of all necessary local
pollution control measures necessary to attain compliance by that date. Id. (citing 64 Fed. Reg. 14,443
(Mar. 25, 1999) (quotations omitted)).
118. See Sierra Club, 314 F.3d at 738.
119. Id. at 739.
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the Houston/Galveston "severe- 17" nonattainment area. 2° As a severe- 17
area, Houston/Galveston is not required to attain compliance under the statute
until November 15, 2007.21 Applying its 1999 policy, the EPA extended the
compliance date for the Beaumont-Port Arthur area to November 15, 2007.122
Notwithstanding its application of Chevron deference to the EPA's
interpretation of the Clean Air Act, the court held that the plain terms of the
Clean Air Act precluded the EPA's extension of the statutory compliance
date. 123 The court essentially relied on two lines of argument.14 First, the
Clean Air Act contains a number of specific provisions that address the
problem of upwind emissions that jeopardize compliance by the downwind
area; none of these provisions, however, generally provide an extension for
regions affected by transport from an upwind region as provided in the EPA's
extension policy. ' Thus, the court inferred that the absence of a comparable
statutory extension was a deliberate act on the part of Congress.'26 Second,
the court distinguished an earlier case in which the D.C. Circuit had
authorized extensions from certain statutory deadlines in the Clean Air Act. '"
This other case involved problems stemming from the "EPA's own action or
inaction, which could not have been foreseen by Congress."'12 The problems
faced by downwind areas such as Beaumont-Port Arthur were presumably
foreseeable by Congress, and the court held that the EPA had no authority to
extend the established compliance dates under these circumstances.1
29
B. Required Reasonably Available Control Measures
Under the Clean Air Act, nonattainment SIPS must implement reasonably
available control measures as expeditiously as possible. 30 RACMs are not
defined in the statute but may include a variety of control techniques including
"transportation control measures" (TCMs).'3' The petitioners claimed that the
EPA failed to require the Beaumont-Port Arthur SIP to include additional
available control measures that constituted RACMs. 1
2
120. Id. at 737, 739.
121. Id. at 739.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 741.
124. Id. at 741-43.
125. Id. at 741.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 741-43.
128. Id. at 742.
129. ld. at 742-43.
130. Id. at 743; Clean Air Act of 1955, § 173, 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1) (2000).
131. See Sierra Club, 314 F.3d at 743.
132. Id. at 737.
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The EPA acknowledged the availability of additional control measures
but declined to require them for several reasons.' First, the EPA applied its
long-standing policy that states need only consider those items as RACMs that
contribute to attainment" 'as expeditiously as practicable.' ,'4 Under this
policy, measures that would reduce the frequency or severity of violations
would not be required if their use would not advance the actual date of
compliance.'35 The court upheld this policy based on provisions in the 1990
Amendments in which Congress expressly preserved existing EPA
guidance. 3 s The court also relied on a Ninth Circuit decision that had
previously upheld the policy.'"
The court also upheld the EPA's ability to engage some form of
cost/benefit analysis in identifying RACMs. 38 According to the court, "the
EPA properly concluded that [m]easures requiring intensive and costly
implementation were not RACMs because they could not be readily
implemented due to excessive administrative burden or local conditions such
as high costs."'39 Although the court concluded that the statute did not
preclude the EPA from using such a cost/benefit analysis, the court did state
that the EPA had an affirmative duty to demonstrate that it has evaluated
available data and to satisfactorily explain its rejection of proposed
RACMs."4°
V. MUNICIPAL STORM WATER PERMIT REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE CLEAN
WATER ACT: CITY OFABILENE v. EPA
In City of Abilene v. EPA, the Fifth Circuit considered challenges to
conditions contained in federally issued National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) storm water permits.' 4' The permits, issued to
the Cities of Abilene and Irving, contained conditions to limit discharges from
Municipal Separate Storm Sewer Systems (MS4s). 42 Among other things, the
permits required the cities to develop and implement programs to limit the
storm water pollution from a variety of sources and to implement a public
education program."' "The [c]ities challenge[d] their permits on both
statutory and constitutional grounds."' 44




137. Id. at 744; see Ober v. Whitman, 243 F.3d 1190(9th Cir. 2001).
138. Sierra Club, 314 F.3d at 744.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 745.
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The permits were required under section 402(p) of the Clean Water Act
that requires MS4s discharge permits to include a variety of limitations
including "such other provisions" that the EPA "determines [are] appropriate
for the control" of pollutants in storm water.'45 The court held that this
provision conferred authority on the EPA to adopt the types of conditions
contained in the cities' permits."6
The court also rejected a claim that by requiring the cities to establish
public education programs, the EPA was violating the Tenth Amendment by
requiring the cities to regulate third parties. 47 The Tenth Amendment reserves
powers to the States that are not delegated to the United States. 48 Under
Supreme Court analysis, the Tenth Amendment limits the ability of the federal
government to compel states to implement a federal regulatory program.'49
The court noted, however, that the Tenth Amendment does not prohibit the
federal government from "persuading" localities to adopt federal programs "so
long as the choice of whether or not to comply lies with the residents of the
State or locality acting through their respective governments."' 5 ° Thus, the
federal government can condition discretionary grants on compliance with a
federal program or otherwise give states alternative choices as long as both
choices do not involve unconstitutional action.' 5'
The court had little problem in upholding the permit conditions. The
cities had been given the option of specific, numeric effluent limitations
applicable to their storm water discharges as an alternative to the contested
storm water conditions.'52 According to the court, the numeric effluent
limitations "would have regulated them in the same manner as other
dischargers of pollutants.""' By voluntarily choosing the management
conditions, "the [c]ities [were not being] compelled to implement a federal
regulatory scheme."' 54 The court also rejected a First Amendment challenge
to the required public information program. 5 The court noted that the cities
not only chose, but actually proposed, the program and were thus not being
compelled to express the federal government's views. 56
The cities also raised an odd challenge claiming that the permits were
"arbitrary and capricious because they authorize[d] the discharge of some, but
145. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 402(p)(3)(B), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(p)(3)(B)(iii) (2000).
146. Sierra Club, 325 F.3d at 661.
147. Id. at 663.
148. Id. at 661.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 662.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 663.
154. Id.




not all, pollutants."' 7 Apparently, the cities were arguing that they would be
liable for third-party discharges into the municipal storm sewers. "8 The court
in this case noted that the EPA's Environmental Appeals Board had concluded
that "the [c]ities' permits expressly provide that [the] liability [of] third-party
dischargers [was] not transferred" to the cities, and thus, presumably, the
permit conditions were appropriate.' 59
VI. PRECLUSION OF CITIZEN SUITS UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT:
LOCKETT V. EPA
In Lockett v. EPA, the court construed provisions of the Clean Water Act
(CWA) that limit the availability of citizen suits. 60 Under section 505(a)(1)
of the CWA, private parties may bring "citizen suits" against persons alleged,
among other things, to be in violation of a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit.' 6 ' The CWA, however, establishes
several jurisdictional barriers to such citizen suits.
6 First, section
505(b)(1)(A) requires that plaintiffs provide notice of their intent to file a
citizen suit at least sixty days prior to filing a complaint.
63
Second, under section 309(g)(6), such suits are barred if the state has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting an administrative action under a
comparable state law.'" This second barrier does not apply, however, if
notice was given prior to commencement of the state action and the citizen
suit is filed within 120 days of providing notice. 65 In Lockett, the court
construed the meaning of comparable state law and certain timing and notice
issues.'"6
The relevant facts in Lockett were undisputed. 67 The suit was brought
by landowners who alleged violations of an NPDES permit for a sewage
treatment plant operated by the Village of Folsom, Louisiana.
68 Some of the




160. 319 F.3d 678, 682 (5th Cir. Jan. 2003).
161. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (2000).
162. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 309(g)(6)(B), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g)(6)(B).
163. Id. § 1319(g)(6)(B). A comparable limitation applies if the state or federal government has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action in federal court. Id. § 1365(b)(I)(B). Since Louisiana
had undertaken administrative enforcement, the relevant limitation on citizen suits was contained in
§ 309(g). Id. § 1319(g)(6).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Lockett v. EPA, 319 F.3d 678, 678 (5th Cir. Jan. 2003).
167. Id. at 681.
168. Id.
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12, 1999.'69 A compliance order was issued by the Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ) on November 4, 1999 against the Village for
various violations in operation of the facility. 7' On December 7, 1999, the
plaintiffs sent a second citizen suit notice letter that restated the first alleged
violations and "referenced ongoing violations."'' The citizen suit was then
filed on March 31,2000.172 The district court dismissed the complaint finding
that (1) the state had commenced an action under a comparable state law and
(2) the plaintiffs had not filed their complaint within 120 days of a notice sent
prior to commencement of the state action.
73
The Court of Appeals affirmed.' 74 The court, in a matter of first
impression in the Fifth Circuit, held that the Louisiana procedures for
administrative enforcement were comparable to the relevant federal
requirements found in section 309(g) of the Clean Water Act.'" The court
"[a]t the outset" noted the primary role of the states in enforcement and stated
that "the requirement that a state law be 'comparable' to the federal statute
should be read broadly to permit states flexibility in deciding how to enforce
anti-pollution laws.'
76
The plaintiffs argued the Louisiana procedures were not comparable
since they lacked notice and comment procedures. 77 The court appeared to
view the issue of comparability as involving an assessment of whether the
state procedures provided "a meaningful opportunity to participate at
significant stages in the decision-making process."'' 7  The court found that the
Louisiana procedures satisfied this standard.7 9  The Louisiana procedures,





173. Id. at 681-82.
174. Id. at 690. The court rejected appellant's argument that the plaintiffs had no "standing" to
appeal the district court opinion since they had been provided an opportunity to participate in the state
proceeding. Id. at 682. The court stated that this argument misconstrued the constitutional standing
inquiry. Id. It was undisputed that plaintiffs satisfied the standing elements of "injury, cause and
redressability." Id. Since the plaintiffs were challenging the district court's legal determination of
comparability and not asserting they were injured by the lack of notice or opportunity to participate in the
state action, the issue of receipt of notice was, according to the court, irrelevant to the standing issue. Id.
The court also rejected appellant's arguments, raised for the first time on appeal, that certain plaintiff-
intervenors were not proper parties since they had not filed a notice of intent to sue. Id. at 683. Although
the court acknowledged that the requirement to provide notice was a matter of subject matter jurisdiction,
the court held that the notice requirement was "not jurisdictional 'in the strict sense of the term' "and the
issue of proper notice was therefore waived since not raised prior to appeal. Id. at 682.
175. Id. at 690.
176. Id. at 684.
177. Id.
178. Id. (citing Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Ams., Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 381 (8th Cir. 1994)).
179. Id. at 685.
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state adjudicatory hearings on state enforcement orders or settlements.' 
°
"Aggrieved parties" have the opportunity to intervene in an adjudicatory
hearing requested by a respondent on a proposed state enforcement order and
may themselves request an adjudicatory hearing on a proposed state settlement
or uncontested order.' The State, however, has discretion to deny
intervention, and the State is required to grant an aggrieved party's request for
a hearing only "when equity and justice require [one]."'8 2 Notwithstanding
the State's considerable discretion to deny rights of public participation, the
court held that this discretion "is reasonably constructed to prevent abuse of
the process and is subject tojudicial review."'83 The court concluded that the
Louisiana administrative enforcement mechanism was therefore comparable
to the Clean Water Act requirements. 
1 4
The court also found that the citizen suit was barred by the timing
provisions of the Clean Water Act.' Because the State had commenced and
was diligently prosecuting an enforcement proceeding under comparable state
law, the citizen suit could only proceed if notice had been provided prior to
commencement of the state proceeding and the citizen suit was commenced
within 120 days of the notice.8 6 It was undisputed that the citizen complaint
was filed more than 120 days after their first notice letter." 7 It was also
undisputed that the second notice letter was sent after commencement of the
state proceeding. ' Therefore, the plaintiffs could rely on neither the first nor
second notice letter tojustify a citizen suit for violations addressed in the state
proceeding. 89 To avoid this problem, the plaintiffs claimed that their second
notice letter, which addressed "ongoing violations," alleged violations not
covered in the state proceeding. 'g The court, however, held that the state
180. See id. at 685-86 (explaining LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 30 § 2050.1 (West 2002)). Under the
Louisiana procedures, the public is not notified of a compliance order or proposed penalty prior to issuance;
but according to the court, the State keeps a list of notices of violations, compliance orders, and penalty
assessments that are available to the public. Id. at 686. After issuance of an order, the respondent may
request an adjudicatory hearing and the public has rights to comment and, in some cases, intervene. Id. at
685. If the respondent agrees to a settlement following an order, public notice of the proposed settlement
is given and comments are accepted. Id. at 680. if a respondent elects to comply with an order without an
adjudicatory hearing or settlement, an "aggrieved party" may request an adjudicatory hearing that may be
granted "when equity and justice [so] require." Id. at 685-86. Although, the State has considerable
discretion in whether to allow a citizen to intervene in an adjudicatory hearing or to grant a citizen's request
for an adjudicatory hearing. See id. at 686.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 686 (explaining LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 30 § 2050.4.B).
183. Id. at 687.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 688-89.
186. id. at 688.
187. Id. at 687-88.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 688-89.
190. Id. at 688.
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compliance order covered future as well as past violations and therefore
addressed the same issues as the second notice. 9
191. Id. at 689-90.
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